T

he Beijing Games displayed the conflicting identities and interests that characterize China’s transitional hybrid society.

Two Faces: Control Freaks and Celebrating Crowds

In the weeks leading up to that magic hour, 8:08 p.m. on 8-08 ’08, police and citizens were put on high alert in Beijing and other Games venues, neighboring cities within a hundred miles, and sensitive ethnic minority regions. Even my bravest Beijing friends were anxiously discussing whether to leave town or at least buy emergency supplies, in preparation for some unexpected disaster to follow those earlier in this “lucky” year. It almost seemed that police had decided the only way to prevent trauma was to scare people out of town and foreigners out of the country. Visitors were unnerved by the ever-smiling but also ever-present volunteer hosts and plain-clothes police. As a friend who lives in Beijing remarked, it seemed that the “un-fun” Olympics would break a world record for LOSS of tourist income.

Once the opening ceremonies closed in safety, having dazzled the country and the world, there was a giant collective sigh of relief as everyone relaxed. The empty Olympic Green began to fill with several generations of local families; cynical ex-pats in Shanghai got on a plane and grabbed last minute tickets. Beijingers on the street warmly welcomed the world. Surprising jaded urbane Chinese, the crowds in the stands clapped and cheered for underdogs and losers as well as for winners. (And I think this was happening before the Propaganda Department sent out guidelines to do so!) China’s critical intellectuals and foreign China experts found themselves as giddy with excitement as the rest. By the end of the second week, the Olympic Spirit had edged out the spirit of Big Brother. People cared less about the (strange) closing ceremonies and more about sharing in the cosmopolitan good cheer that rose like a rainbow emerging from the clouds.

Two Rules of Law

In theory, the requirements of the Olympics host, like WTO membership in 2001, force the Chinese state to follow international rules, even when they impinge on its authority and interests. Western commentators and Chinese bloggers have pointed out the abuses of political and religious rights as the police did a thorough “house-cleaning” before the Games. All potential “trouble-makers” (dissidents and civil rights lawyers, migrant workers, house church leaders) were taken off the street or forced into inactivity. Hollow gestures to Olympics norms included areas assigned for demonstrations -- for which grievants were unable to get permits, and a remote and unpublicized religion center for athletes. Chaplains for athletes were limited to state-employed Chinese chaplains. Small prayer rooms and sterile worship services forced athletes to bend the rules to get their own chaplains in on day passes, or find services off the grounds. Yet a Chinese friend is optimistic about the future payoff of China’s youth having this exposure to foreign cultures and especially to the Olympics model of “following the rules.”

Two Olympics: CCTV vs. NBC

CCTV’s coverage did its best to lend the glow of the Games to the Party leadership, to reap the gains in national pride and international acclaim. The nightly news, which highlights “the most important national and world events of the day,” focused on China’s growing stash of gold medals and appearances by the members of the Politburo standing committee. The whole National Anthem took up much of the half hour. (The random murder of an American was never mentioned, and events in Georgia were far, far away). Meanwhile, Beijingers at home watching their big-screen T.Vs. complained about CCTV’s poor coverage of the opening ceremonies compared with NBC, which had much better footage and commentary, even to explain sometimes obscure cultural references.

All this politics was invisible to NBC’s audience, which naturally sat through hours and hours of events Americans were winning and stories about the athletes, with only a few photo ops when Hu Jintao or Bush attended key games. NBC’s excellent “local color” stories covering everything from food to martial arts, with local “man on the street” interviews, went a long way in making “China” real, human, friendly and likable.

Two Elites: Political and Commercial

An interesting report in Time contrasted two VIP parties thrown during the Olympics. One was convened in a corner of the Forbidden City, hosted by a Vice Premier for former President Bush and Dr. Kissinger, with legions of pioneer U.S. CEOs and Chinese state enterprise managers. Endless toasts of mao-tai were accompanied by traditional Chinese music. A younger crowd met at a funky “commune-style” resort out by the Great Wall, hosted by the latest “it” couple -- local private real estate developers, and attended by media celebrities and CEOs from the IT industry. There was champagne for sipping and rock bands and rappers for dancing. Most partygoers had been educated and worked overseas. While grateful to their elders for the opportunities bequeathed them, they are different in their outlook in many ways. (more on generational change in a later essay).

Two Kinds of Nationalism

It was win-win for political Party-State centered nationalism and cultural China-centered nationalism. The government grew in popularity for gaining face for Chinese with its efficient and impressive hosting (although no doubt scandals over costs, ticket distribution etc. will emerge to tarnish this shine). There will be a stronger sense of national belonging as China’s vast millions lived through a rare nationwide shared experience. Even distant villagers had banners and were cheering in front of the T.V. The May earthquake provided a similar realization of being part of the global community.

But fortunately, the Games were neither traumatic nor an anti-foreign experience, but instead fueled a positive national pride in becoming not just accepted but respected in the global family. One essayist recounted his surprise when his Chinese wife and her family didn’t succumb to “gold-medal fever,” but cheered for Americans to win, out of a sense that “China should be more humble.” In all, this positive experience should go a long way to mitigate the (state-induced) sense of victim-itis. Is it too much to expect a revision of textbooks to reduce the pages devoted to the “century of humiliation”?

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